Until the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration or the tire industry develops an idiot proof system of tire recall notification, consumers really need to assume some of the responsibility. There have been lawsuits brought on the behalf of vehicle owners involved in accidents resulting from defects in recalled tires – owners who were assured by the tire dealer that the tires were not part of a publicized recall. While the majority of drivers travel on safe tires, there is still the chance you’re not one of them.

The following websites provide information on tire recalls:

• www.recalls.gov/nhtsa.html  This is one of two NHTSA sites that allow users to log in their tire information to check on current recalls.
• www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/recalls/recallsearch.cfm  Another NHTSA, this one managed by the Office of Defects Investigation.
• www.dmv.org/recalls.php  A privately owned website, dmv.org is not affiliated with any state Department of Motor Vehicles, but still can provide information on current recalls.

 If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.

How tire recalls are supposed to function appears simple and seamless. So, you figure there has to be a fly in this particular ointment and, indeed, there is. In the 38-year history of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s recall process, only 20-percent of potentially dangerous tires have actually been taken off the roadway.One reason the recovery rate seems incomprehensible low is that some of the tires subject to the recall have already been replaced by the vehicle owner. The process leading up to a recall involves analyzing complaints, either by the manufacturer or the NHTSA. So, it’s safe to assume tires have years and miles on them before a recall is initiated.

Two major issues stand between a functional tire recall system and what actually exists: tire registration and tire identification and tracking.

Believe it or not, when you go to your local tire dealer to buy new tires, you should register those tires at the purchase point. During 2009, the tire industry is projected to turn out 356 million tires and 80-percent of those will be sold on the aftermarket through tire dealers. Federal regulations require the dealer to provide the registration cards to customers but according to the NHTSA and the Rubber Manufacturers Association, only 10-percent of tires are actually registered. CIMS Inc., an Akron, Ohio registration services firm puts that number at 28.6-percent. In some cases, the manufacturer simply does not supply the registration cards to the dealer; in others, the dealer may neglect the process. And, finally, in our rush to get back on the road, we brush the card aside. In the process, we’ve basically severed our tires with any potential recall process.

Approximately 30 million tires are purchased as used and the registration requirements do not apply.

When the recall involves tires mounted on new vehicles, like the Ford Explorer/Firestone recall, the tire manufacturer has to work with the automaker and its dealer network to identify consumers based on the Vehicle Identification Number (VIN) and tire lot records.

An even more complex problem is tracing individual tires. The NHTSA requires each tire to carry a Tire Identification Number (TIN). This 11-digit number identifies the plant of origin as well as the week and year of manufacture. Given the parameters, thousands of tires will carry the same TIN with no individual tire identification. As the tire moves through the system, from manufacturer to automaker or wholesaler to retailer to consumer, the TIN is often ignored. There is no automated method to capture the identification number.

While the TIN system was developed to assist the NHTSA in the event of a recall, it can also be used to determine the age of the tire. Back in the 1970s, when the system was initiated, the tire industry maintained that ties were not perishable. Since then, studies have indicated tires deteriorate over time with or without actual use. Even the proverbial “little old lady from Pasadena” should replace her tires every six to 10 years, even if the tread is still sufficient. So, age does matter.

The TIN is printed on the inside of the mounted sidewall. For a consumer to check the identification, he would have to crawl under his car with a flashlight.

Unlike the  multiply-flawed registration system, there is a logical solution to identify tires: a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) chip embedded in the tire and readable with a simple hand-held scanner. Whether embedded or fixed to the sidewall, a tag the size of a grain of rice can help the dealer track and fully identify tires. The technology has been used by commercial truck and aircraft fleets to guarantee regular service. Tires used by NASCAR teams use RFID to track their high performance tires. The technology is available now, it’s just up to the tire industry to incorporate it into consumer tires.

 If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.

While delays in government processes should come as no surprise, during the months Foreign Tire Sales was investigating the possibility of defects in the Compass, Telluride, Westlake and YKS tires imported from China, nearly a half-million potentially dangerous tires were still in use on light trucks.

The process started, May, 2007, with the lawsuit filed by the families of the two deceased and one seriously injured passengers in the roll-over accident caused by defective tires imported by FTS. The company had stopped importing the tires made by Hangzhou Rubber Co. once the missing or reduced gum strip defect was discovered. But the lawsuit, rather than the discovery of the defect, initiated the defect report to the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration in June of that year.

It took a month for FTS to gather the information from the Chinese manufacturer and an additional two months to work out the details and scope of the recall. In testimony before a Senate committee, the NHTSA blamed inadequate regulations for the delay, maintaining existing regulations do not deal with importers refusing to recall defective product. FTS’ “refusal” was based on lack of funds to handle the replacement and disposal of the defective tires.

Individual states, however, were not hog-tied by regulations. Twenty-four state attorney generals ordered a recall of the tires sold in their states in early August. Washington state issued an alert outlining the brand names, sizes and state tire stores that had sold the tires in question. Once the recall was officially launched, full details for replacement of the defective tires were issued.

Once the publicity on the defective imported tires hit the media, U.S. politicians added their voices. The heat of the response was stoked by a series of dangerous consumer goods imported from China, including tainted dog food and toys decorated with lead-based paint. Individual Senators’ responses ranged from a demand for some form of government action aimed at China’s flawed safety inspections to a letter requesting President Bush force the NHTSA to expedite the recall.

If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.

The road to a tire recall is forked: either the manufacturer identifies a real or potential safety issue and begins the process or the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration receives enough complaints, launches an investigation and, depending on the results, initiates the recall.

If you think you have a valid complaint regarding either your vehicle’s stock or replacement tires, take them back to the car dealer and tire shop to help determine if the tire failure was a result of a tire defect or simple wear and tear or road hazards. This kick starts the process through the tire manufacturer. If you’re convinced the tire is defective, or that suspicion is verified at the point of purchase, register a complaint through the NHTSA by calling 1-800-DASH-2-DOT or go to the administration’s website (www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ivoq/) and register your complaint. Even if the tires are stock equipment on a new vehicle, the tire manufacturer, not the automaker, is responsible for the recall procedure.

If your tires have been recalled, here’s what to expect:

• You should receive a letter informing you of the tire recall. Unfortunately, this isn’t always the case. Many owners of recalled tires hear of the issue through the news media. The only way to guarantee you will be notified of tire recalls is to go to the NHTSA website and fill out the appropriate form to receive email notifications of tire recalls. Make sure you are aware of the time frame within which you have to replace the tires.
• The letter or the NHTSA email will provide instructions you need to follow. There should be a customer service, toll-free number to call to verify that you have tires subject to the recall.
• The instructions will usually tell you to visit an authorized service center where you can have your tires replaced. If the manufacturer does not have enough inventory for a same-tire swap, you will receive equivalent tires that meet your vehicle’s requirements.
• During the time between your notification and your trip to the service center, make sure the tires are as safe as possible until you have them replaced. Check the vehicle’s inflation instructions, usually posted on the driver’s door jamb or in the owner’s manual and follow the recommended air pressure. Also, avoid driving at high speeds especially on exceptionally hot roads. Eliminate any extra weight in the vehicle and comply with the manufacturer’s maximum load rating.

 If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.

The recent and on-going collapse of the lending and auto industries has exposed an important political fact. There are those who favor a free, self-regulating marketplace (Republicans) and those who recognize unfettered capitalism is not necessarily a good thing and support regulation (Democrats). At least for now, the Democrats seem to have the right idea. So, what has been the relationship between government and auto safety, not counting the prospect of bailing the flailing industry out of its current quagmire? Like all things political, it’s been cyclical. the following is a brief outline of that relationship:

• Ralph Nader’s Unsafe at Any Speed can be credited with the first highway safety legislation as well as the birth of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) in the 1960s. Nader’s book focused on the roll-over tendencies of the Chevrolet Corvair, one of the early compact cars. Congress leaped into action, conducted hearings and came up with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 and the Highway Safety Act of 1966. The newly-formed NHTSA was tasked with enforcing safety standards, investigating safety defects, setting and enforcing fuel economy standards and conducting research into driver behavior and traffic safety.
• By the early 1970s, gas prices were soaring; Congress responded by enacting the Energy Policy and Conservation Act requiring the automakers to meet fuel efficiency standards: Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE). As the name implies, the standards were based on corporate averages, setting off the introduction of econo-models to help with that averaging process. At the time, light trucks were primarily used as work vehicles and the fuel requirements were less stringent than passenger cars. The auto makers took advantage of the lower standards and the Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV) was born. While classified as a light truck, SUVs were heavily marketed as family cars replacing the station wagon concept.
• During the Carter Administration in the late 1970s, the NHTSA was armed with stiffer regulations and initiated investigations including the Ford Pinto’s gas tank problem that led to explosions following rear-end collisions.
• Then came the Reagan Administration and a move to deregulate whenever possible. the American auto industry was suffering from waves of imports and deregulation was seen as a positive shot in the arm for the industry. The NHTSA’s budget was cut and staff was directed to repeal existing regulations rather than recommending new ones.
• The SUV’s tendency to roll over was exposed in 1980 with a 60 Minutes report on the Jeep CJ, airing tests conducted by the Insurance Institute of Highway safety. The CJ rolled during a “J” turn test, a sweeping right hand turn followed by a straight-away, as well as during common evasive maneuvers. The American public didn’t seem to care; the Jeep CJ continued to sell well and competing manufacturers accelerated their own plans for SUVs.
• Ford introduced its answer to the rolling Jeep with the Bronco II in 1983. Sales topped 700,000 through the end of the decade, but as sales mounted so did lawsuits from roll-over accidents. Plaintiffs discovered that Ford knew the Bronco tipped on two wheels at speeds as low as 20 mph, but did nothing to resolve the safety issue. Engineers suggested widening the vehicle by just two-inches for a more stable platform. Management didn’t want to postpone the target vehicle introduction date.
• By 1986, Sen. Tim Wirth petitioned the NHTSA to force a redesign of the SUV, increasing its stability. His ammunition was a study indicating a relationship between a vehicle’s static stability factor (the width of the track divided by two times the height of its center of gravity) and that vehicle’s stability. NHTSA engineers analyzed the information and found “a pronounced and consistent pattern” supporting the theory that a change in overall dimension would reduce SUV’s tendency to roll over. The Reagan-appointed chief of the NHTSA rejected the concept.
• In 1989, the Ford Bronco was in serious trouble with trial lawyers and safety advocates requesting a recall and the Insurance Institute for Highway safety rating it the most deadly SUV on the road. The NHTSA refused to investigate the Bronco. The logic behind the decision was frightening: to find a safety-related defect, evidence had to be shown that the specific vehicle’s performance was worse than other vehicles in the same category. Basically, the NHTSA concluded, all SUVs were dangerous, and the Bronco not that much more so.
• With the sales success of the Bronco, Ford was preparing to introduce its Explorer in spring of 1989. When put to the same Consumer Report stability test the Bronco had failed, the Explorer also failed. Again, engineers recommended widening the vehicle by two-inches and management, once again, declined. The Explorer became the top selling SUV the following spring.
• As the first war against Iraq was underway, Sen. Richard Bryan proposed stiffer CAFE fuel standards that would include SUVs in the passenger car category. The first Pres. George Bush’s NHTSA head rationalized that stiffer fuel standards would result in smaller cars. Crash tests were conducted showing the danger of big car/small car encounters. Films of the tests were used in an ad campaign funded by the auto industry. The bill died.
• In 1991, an attempt was made to tack on tougher safety regulations to a transportation bill. The only reg that survived was a mandate for passenger side airbags. Roll-over issues were watered down to a “consideration” rather than a regulation. In 1994, Bill Clinton’s Secretary of Transportation also declined to explore roll-over issues with regulations. His answer was a safety sticker with roll-over ratings on all new cars, allowing the buyer to make an informed decision. The sticker concept was declared officially dead in 1999 after an effective attack by Michigan legislators.
• In early 2000, the Ford Explorer/Firestone roll-over/tread separation issue finally got the attention of the NHTSA. Ninety complaints had been logged with the administration; the complaints included reports of 33 crashes, 27 injuries and four deaths. Firestone recalled millions of Wilderness ATX tires, Ford replaced 13 million tires that remained on its vehicles. While the Explorer’s stability was brought into question during the investigation, the vehicle remained the top selling SUV.
• Seven years after the proposal to include rollover ratings on new vehicle window stickers, the NHTSA decides to rate vehicles on rollover stability as part of its New Car Assessment Program. The information was made available to consumers on the administration’s website.
• In the fall of 2000, the TREAD Act was passed. One element was the requirement that NHTSA develop a dynamic stability test for rollovers.
• 2001, Ford introduces a re-designed Ford Explorer. The new model is two inches wider than the old version and includes independent rear suspension.

 If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.

The Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TRAD) Act was intended to provide the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration with advance information on product defects, allowing the agency to expedite investigations and possible recalls. But among the cynics both in the industry and in the safety advocacy groups, the question remained would the Early Warning Reporting system work or would the tsunami of data go someplace within the NHTSA warehouses to simply die.

The answer to the question, Will the TREAD Act work?, has two parts, depending on who’s asking the question. Despite the recent move by the NHTSA to make specific information available through its website (www.SaferCar.gov), advocacy groups maintain the Act does not provide relevant information to consumers. From the NHTSA’s and industry watchers’ perspectives, the Act appears to be working. With the volume of information that has been pouring into the NHTSA since early 2004, it was thought the administration would follow the lead of the Internal Revenue Service and selectively examine warranty claims and consumer complaints, publicly launch investigations and encourage or require product recalls. The fear of “audits” would keep the industry in line both in terms of valid reporting and conducting their own preemptive recalls.

Just months after the first reports were filed with the NHTSA, the administration went very public with some of the early information:

• Ford Excursions with Firestone Steeltex tires were experiencing rapid air loss resulting in six crashes with five fatalities and 20 injuries. It seems that Firestone figured out the pattern of failure before the NHTSA could and launched a voluntary recall.
• Ford Windstar minivans with doors that slide open while the vehicle is moving. Fifty six complaints were logged but no injuries.
• GM Silverado and Sierra pickups experiencing failure of the cables that hold up the tailgate, with 61,025 warranty claims.
• Kia Sephia and Sportage had 1,495 warranty claims for defective seat belt latches with a resulting 28 injuries after 35 crashes.
• Toyota Camry, Camry Solara and Lexus ES300 sedans reported unexpected surging acceleration causing 30 crashes.

Using the Firestone Steeltex failures as an example of the effectiveness of TREAD and the Early Warning Reporting, a side effect of the system appears to be early action on the part of manufacturers knowing the quarterly reports could result in an NHTSA investigation and adverse publicity. According to an Associated Press article, Firestone’s spokesman said “the data suggested there was an issue and the decision was made that instead of having a long, drawn out investigation to figure out if there is a problem, let’s just step up and replace the tires.”

Unfortunately, the same steps were not taken by Hangzhou Rubber Co. or Foreign Tire Sales, Inc. when tread separation problems became obvious.

 If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.

The strength of the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act hinges on the effectiveness of the Early Warning Reporting (EWR) component. The theory is simple: the number of deaths and serious injuries from roll-over accidents involving Ford Explorers and Firestone tires would have been reduced if the information had been available to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the public.

Among many in the auto aftermarket industry familiar with suspension and tire dynamics, the Explorer/Firestone situation was the perfect storm. The SUV was set up with the stiff suspension system in anticipation of the vehicle’s use as a light truck. The SUV was the original “soccer mom” hauler primarily driven by a market segment unfamiliar with the implications of a stiff suspension and the high center of gravity of a light truck.

SUV’s as a class are the least stable and most prone to rollover accidents. Add to this mix tires with inflation rate issues and tread separation when driven at improper inflation over time and the inevitable happened, over and over again. If owners of Explorers had been aware of any element of this potential disaster, lives could have been saved. For some advocacy groups, this was the goal of the EWR, to provide early information on potential dangers. However, the EWR data, until recently, has been confidential, available only to the NHTSA for analysis and possible investigation.

The information being gathered includes warranty claims, production numbers, property damage claims, injury-causing and fatal accidents, consumer complaints and field reports.

The reporting schedule was phased in, allowing both the NHTSA and the industry to develop data bases and other systems to deal with accumulating and reporting the information. The first volley of data was due Dec. 1, 2004 for the quarter ending Sept. 30 followed by historical data for the years between July 1, 2000 and June 30, 2003. As of the beginning of 2009, the EWR has been functioning for just four years.

Following a series of lawsuits and queries through the Freedom of Information Act, the NHTSA opened some of the collected data to the public in early fall of 2008. The information is available through the administration’s website www.SaferCar.gov. One of the advocacy groups dogging the government for a more open, transparent system, Public Citizen, still feels the NHTSA has “fallen short of complying with the spirit of the law.” The non-profit’s areas of criticism include the fact the website is not user friendly and does not include the numbers of consumer complaints, field reports taken by company engineers or claims involving death and injury. All that information is still considered confidential.

 If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.

In the late 1990s, you couldn’t miss the accounts of rollover accidents involving Ford Explorers fitted with Firestone tires. With a total of 270 deaths involved over a period of nearly 10 years, the biggest unanswered question was not how the accidents happened or who was at fault, but how did it go on for so long without some action on the part of the manufacturers or the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration .

In reality, the number of complaints registered with the NHTSA was minor compared to the inquiries and inevitable lawsuits filed against the manufacturers. The problem was no communication between the two and no way for the NHTSA to see emerging problems.

In response, Congress passed the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation (TREAD) Act in the fall of 2000. The purpose: to address the deficiencies in the system that allowed the Ford/Firestone catastrophe to happen in the first place. The most valuable element of the Act was the Early Warning Reporting requiring auto manufacturers and auto component manufacturers to report claims and reports of injury or death related to its products to the NHTSA. In theory, the data would allow the administration to initiate investigations and require recalls in a timely and effective way.

The following are components of the Act that impact tire safety:

• New tire labeling requirements to provide more information to both the consumer and the tire dealer.
• Revamped tire testing standards. Current testing standards had not been updated since 1967 when bias ply, rather than radial, tires dominated the marketplace.
• Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems (TPMS) incorporated into new vehicles, effective as of the 2008 model year. Two systems are currently in use: direct systems with sensors in each tire triggering when the tire is 25-percent below the recommended psi; indirect systems that run off the anti-lock brake system, triggering at 30-percent below the recommended psi.
• Manufacturers are required to report recalls or safety campaigns conducted in foreign countries.
• Selling or leasing recalled tires knowingly is illegal.
• Owners who have replaced defective tires prior to an official recall are to be reimbursed by the manufacturer.
• The NHTSA can mandate a competitive product as a replacement for a recalled tire if the original manufacturer does not have a suitable replacement.
• Products manufactured in foreign countries for sale in the United States are held to the same reporting requirements as American manufacturers.

If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.

 We’re all vaguely familiar with the recall process, even if we’ve never participated. You get a notice, you have the recalled product repaired or replaced. What’s so complex about that process? What if the product, like the defective Compass Telluride tire, is manufactured in another country for sale in the U.S.? Now, we get complicated.

The regulations governing recalls do not take into consideration an American importer of foreign goods that does not have the resources to conduct the recall. In the case of Foreign Tire Sales and the defective light truck tires manufactured by Hangzhou Rubber Company, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration offered the company no sympathy, ordering FTS to file its remedy plan.

FTS appealed to the NHTSA for assistance in conducting the recall of up to 450,000 defective tires, claiming the strong possibility of bankruptcy if it had to absorb the cost of replacing the tires sold under the names Westlake, Telluride, Compass and YKS. FTS had filed lawsuit against the Chinese manufacturer for unspecified damages and to order the manufacturer to conduct the recall and supply replacements made to the original specifications. Hangzhou initially admitted leaving out or reducing the gum strip designed to ensure belt integrity, then claimed no gum strip was included in FTS’ design specifications for the product. The chances of FTS’ success in the suit are slim. The Chinese government’s General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine conducted tests on the tires and issued a statement that they met U.S. safety standards.

FTS’ solution was to announce a unique first-come, first-served recall, reducing the number of recalled tires from 450,000 to 250,000. Consumer tires would be replaced until the company’s $8 to $9 million set aside for the recall ran out. It was speculated, based on a 30-percent return rate, that the funds would cover the company’s costs.

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While a defective Compass Telluride light truck tire ended the lives of two young men in August, 2006, the story of this tire defect started on another continent six years before.

2000: Foreign Tire Sales of New Jersey contracts with Hangzhou Rubber Company in China to manufacture light truck tires for sales in the U.S. According to FTS’ Defect and Non-Compliance report, the company’s engineers worked with Hangzhou to ensure the tires would meet federal safety standards.

May, 2002: At a meeting between FTS and Hangzhou, the importer stressed the importance of tire safety. The publicity generated by the Ford Explorer/Firestone tire-related roll-over accidents had increased public and governmental awareness of tire safety issues. Federal regulatory agencies were looking much more closely at light truck tires. FTS staff requested Hangzhou manufacture tires with nylon cap plies for increased endurance. The early run of imported tires passed endurance tests, according to FTS.

October 2005: The first indications of a problem with FTS’ imported tires come in the form of an increase in the warranty adjustments on the tires. FTS offered a limited warranty against tire defects within five years of purchase or manufacture, prorated depending on the degree of tread wear. Hangzhou staff assured FTS the tires were sound. Nevertheless, FTS initiated tire tests which revealed some tires appeared to have insufficient or missing gum strips, a feature that preserves the integrity of the tire belts.

May 2006: An ambulance equipped with Hangzhou tires crashed in New Mexico; the roll-over accident was caused by a blown tire. FTS pulled tires from other ambulances and found insufficient or missing gum strips on tires manufactured in 2004 and 2005.

June 2006: FTS stops buying tires from Hangzhou Rubber Co.

August 2006: Rafael Melo and Claudeir Figueriedo are killed in a roll-over accident involving Hangzhou tires made in 2004; Carlos Souza is seriously injured.

September 2006: According to FTS, Hangzhou admits it eliminated or reduced gum strips on an unspecified number of tires, but reintroduced the strip in January 2006.

March 2007: FTS continued testing Hangzhou tires and found that the tires developed tread/belt separation at 25,000 miles. In its report to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), FTS was unable to identify how many or which tires were defective because Hangzhou had refused to provide the Tire Identification Numbers of tires manufactured with insufficient or missing gum strips.

May 2007: The families of the victims of the van roll-over accident filed suit against the Hangzhou; FTS filed a suit against Hangzhou and notified NHTSA of the defect —  a full year after the New Mexico ambulance crash and eight months after the company’s discovery of the defect.

June, 2007: The NHTSA orders FTS to recall the defective tires. The total number of tires could reach 455,000.

August, 2007: FTS agrees to recall 255,000 of the Hangzhou truck tires, estimating the number is half of the defective tires the company imported from China. The delay in issuing the recall comes a month later than anticipated due to the time required to gather information from the manufacturer. Hangzhou claims it had found no evidence that the tires contain any structural defects or are missing any safety features. The company further claimed FTS’ design did not include the gum strip. Chinese government inspectors issued a statement that “sample tests on the tires show they’re qualified to be sold in the U.S.”  The standards in question are the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 119 (FMVSS 119).

If you have been involved in a tire-related accident, contact us using the form on the right and we’ll help you locate an attorney.